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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CIVIL LIBERTIES- FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. THE RIGHT
OF PRIVACY.
Arnold Johnson applied for a temporary order to restrain the
defendant, the Cleveland Press, from continuing the publication of
articles which included a list of the names appearing upon the nominating
petitions of the Communist Party. The petition alleged in part that the
publication, in its obvious playing upon the "fifth column" and Com-
munist hysteria, had exposed the signers of such petitions to open terror
and physical violence. Damages were asked for the alleged invasion of
the Plaintiff's and other signers' rights of privacy. Defendant filed a
general demurrer on the ground that the petition failed to state a cause
of action; in sustaining the demurrer, the court ruled that the right
of a free press is paramount to the right of privacy, and freedom of the
press imports freedom from any censorship over what shall be published.'
Ohio's Constitution, Article I, Section 2, provides: "Every
citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects
being responsible for the abuse of the right and no law shall be passed
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press."
It is apparent from the language used that punishment, and not
prevention, shall be the method of controlling abuses of the constitution-
ally guaranteed rights of free speech and press. While it was never
intended that these guaranties were to constitute an absolute license to
speak and publish anything one pleases,2 the determination of where
license begins and freedom ends is generally held to be in the first instance
a legislative matter.3 Although the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution protects the fundamental liberties from state aggression,'
the states in the exercise of the police power may enact legislation punish-
ing those who abuse freedom of speech and of the press by utterances
'Johnson ct al. v. Scripps Publishing Co., 32 Ohio L. Abs. 423 (1940).
"State v. Kassay, xz6 Ohio St. 177, 184 N.E. 52 (1933)5 Davis v. State, is8
Ohio St. zS, 16o N.E. 473 (gzS); State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 433, 204 Pac. 958 (1922);
Whitney v. Calif., 274 U.S. 357 (2926).
'Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 675 (931); State v. Holm, 139 Minn.
267, r67 N.W. aSs (xgxS)5 Commonwealth v. Libby, z16 Mass. 356, 103 N.E. 923
(1914).
'Schneider v. Town of Irvington, -U.S , 84 L. Ed. axS, 6o Sup. Ct. 179 (1939);
Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925); DeJonge v. State of Ore., 229
U.S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1937).
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inimical to public welfare, or tending to incite to crime.' Once the limits
to their exercise are set, it becomes the duty of the courts to determine
whether the announced limitations go too far.6 However, the power
of a state to abridge the constitutionally guaranteed liberties must find
its justification in a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized
government.
Blackstone's definition of freedom of the press, "principally, although
not exclusively, immunities from previous restraints or censorship,"' has
become the accepted rule in a majority of our courts. Ohio, in accord
with the great weight of authority, is opposed to a court of equity's taking
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief when that relief amounts to a
control in advance of matters to appear in print.' However, a few
jurisdictions will, upon the request of a plaintiff who has received a
verdict in a law action branding the defendent's publications as libelous,
grant an injunction to prevent further publication of the libel.' Even
under the most favorable interpretation of the minority view, the court
in the principal case could not grant the injunction demanded by the
plaintiff.
Equally without merit was the plaintiff's claim for damages allegedly
incurred as a result of the invasion of his and the other signers' right of
privacy. The right of privacy has been defined as the right of an individ-
ual to withold himself and his property from public scrutiny if he so
chooses."0 Many jurisdictions deny the existence of a legal right of
privacy." Others recognize it as a legal right upon which a demand
for injunctive relief or damages may be grounded.'" Granted the
existence of the right, decisions tend to recognize the several limitations
upon the right as announced by Warren and Brandeis.'" Foremost
among the limitations is the principle that the right of privacy does
not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public interest.'4
'Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S., 247 U.S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560 (1938)i Stromberg
v. People of the State of Calif.,283 U.S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532, 73 A.L.R. 1484. (931)-
"State v. Babst, xo4. Ohio St. 167, 135 N.E. 525 (19zz)5 U.S. v. Harmon 45 Fed.
414 (1890.
'IV BL. COMM. *152.
'Johnson et al. v. Scripps Publishing Co., supra; Dopp v. Doll, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep.
4z8, 13 Cinc. L. Bull. 335 (1885); Daily v. Superior Ct., izz Cal. 94, 44 Pac. 459,
3z L.R.A. 273 (1896).
'Wolf v. Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139 (i916).
'0 BOUVIER LAV DICT., "Privacy."
'Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 69x, 117 Pac. 594 (1911)-
"Brent v. Morgan, 2Z Ky. 765 (1927)5 Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 65z,
134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Kunz v. Allen, 1oz Kan. 883 (1918). See (1938) 4 O.S.L.J. 396.
"The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193.
"Jones v. Herald Post Co., 23o Ky. Z27, 18 S.W. (zd) 972 (39z9); State v. Jun-
kin, 85 Neb. 11, 1zz N.W. 473 (i9o9); Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156,
73 S.E. 47z (i9xz).
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Nominating petitions, by statute in Ohio,'" when filed with the secretary
of state, become documents of public record open to public inspection and
publication. It has been held that there was no invasion of property
where a person, whether willingly or not, participates in a public event
and has his role in that event publicized. 6 By availing himself of the
right to nominate by petition, the voter assumed to know that the petition
he signs, when filed with the secretary of state, will become public record.
Consequently, there can be no immunity for the signers of a petition
which will be invaded through the publication of their names by a
newspaper. E.G.
CORPORATIONS
APPRAISAL STATUTES- SALE OF CORPORATE ASSETS - CON-
CLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF FAIR VALUE UNDER OHIO
STATUTE.
In a recent issue of this Journal' the decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court in the case of Voeller, et al. v. Neldston Warehouse Company,
et al., was reviewed. In that case the constitutionality of the appraisal
section of the Ohio Corporation Act' was attacked. Over two-thirds
of the shareholders had voted for the sale of a piece of real estate which
constituted substantially all of the corporation's remaining assets. Plain-
tiffs voted against the sale and, complying with all the conditions
precedent of the statute,4 named an amount which they demanded of
the corporation as the fair cash value of their shares. The corporation
refused to pay the amount demanded but made no counter offer. After
six months had elapsed, neither party having filed a petition for appraisal,
the dissenting shareholders filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas
asking that judgment be rendered in their favor for the amount originally
demanded. There was judgment for the defendant which was later
reversed by the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting. The case
'OHIO G.C. Sec. 4 7 8s5-92, reads in part, 1.... such petition papers shall be preserved
and open under proper regulation to the public for at least five days prior to the fifty-fifth
day preceding the election, during which time objections may be filed thereto and be heard
by the ,ecretary of state or board as the case may be ....
"
5 Joncs v. Herald Post Co., supra.
'Note (1940) 6 O.S.L.J. 308.
a 136 Ohio St. 427, z6 N.E. (2d) 44z (194).
'OHio G. C., sec. 8623-72 par. 7: "If such petition (for appraisal) is not filed
within such period (six months), the fair cash value of the shares shall conclusively be
deemed to be equal to the amount offered to the dissenting shareholder by the corporation
if any such offer shall have been made by it as above provided, or in the absence thereof,
then an amount equal to that demanded by the dissenting shareholder as above provided."
' OIo G.C., sec. 8623-72.
